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Abstract 
This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine 
how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high-tax 
countries.  We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in 
determining the growth effect.  First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may 
erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government’s infrastructure expenditure, thereby 
reducing growth.  Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of 
capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth.  The 
overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects.  The 
welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare-enhancing if the 
government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high.  
Moreover, the welfare-maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth-maximizing 
income tax rate if tax havens are present.   
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1. Introduction 
 Tax havens have attracted increasing attention from policy-makers in recent 
years.  By definition, the term “tax haven” refers to a jurisdiction that imposes little 
or no taxes and offers itself as a place to be used by non-resident firms or individuals 
to escape the tax burden in their home country (OECD, 1998).  The empirical 
evidence reveals that in 2006, US foreign direct investment in tax havens amounted to 
around 4% of GDP.1  With the presence of tax havens, multinational firms can 
engage in interest stripping paperwork; more specifically, they can generate interest 
deductions in a high-tax host country by directing interest payments to low-tax haven 
countries.  In practice, however, tax havens are usually regarded as “harmful” and 
need to be eliminated by the high-tax countries.  As stressed in the 1998 OECD 
report, “governments cannot stand back while their tax bases are eroded through the 
actions of countries which offer taxpayers ways to exploit havens to reduce the tax 
that would otherwise be payable to them.” 
 This traditional “negative” viewpoint of tax havens is theoretically modeled by 
Slemrod and Wilson (2009), in which tax havens are viewed as “parasites” on the tax 
bases of high-tax countries and thus decrease public good provision.  Therefore, the 
elimination of tax haven activities can certainly increase tax revenues and improve 
social welfare.  This negative view is also supported by Krautheim and Schmidt- 
Eisenlohr (2011), who consider tax competition between a tax haven and a large 
country with heterogeneous firms.  As for campaigning against tax havens, Elsayyad 
and Konrad (2012) argue that the current OECD process against tax havens, which is 
to reduce the number of tax havens instead of eliminating them altogether, can be 
                                                 
1
 In 2006, US direct foreign investment amounted to US$2,477 billion and US GDP amounted to 
US$13,399 billion (US Bureau of Economic Analysis; http://www.bea.gov).  Moreover, according to 
Dharmapala (2008), a fraction of about 25% of US direct foreign investment is located in tax havens, 
which would have been US$619 billion in 2006.  Therefore, it can be roughly inferred that US foreign 
direct investment in tax havens account for around 4.6% of GDP. 
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harmful to welfare in OECD countries.  
 However, whether the existence of tax havens is unfavorable to high-tax 
countries becomes more controversial due to the fact that a growing number of studies 
propose some new “beneficial” viewpoints of tax havens.   For example, in their 
empirical study, Desai et al. (2006a) find that the multinational firms benefit from tax 
haven operations by paying significantly lower taxes compared to non-multinational 
firms.  Hong and Smart (2010) show that tax havens can provide firms with 
opportunities for international tax planning, which makes the firms more willing to 
invest and thus benefits the workers in the home country.  As a result, Hong and 
Smart (2010) find that an increase in tax planning stemming from tax havens is 
associated with a higher level of social welfare.  Johannesen (2010) proposes that tax 
havens make it less attractive for countries to set a low tax rate and thus have the 
effect of mitigating the problem of tax competition.  He further shows that this 
positive effect could possibly dominate other negative effects, thereby enabling 
high-tax countries to benefit from the existence of tax havens.2 
 This paper develops a general equilibrium model featuring endogenous growth 
and tax havens.  We ask the following question: Does the existence of tax havens 
lead to a deterioration in the growth of high-tax host countries?  Our analysis points 
out that the answer to the question is uncertain and is determined by two conflicting 
effects.  First, tax avoidance activities resulting from tax havens erode the tax bases 
and thus reduce government spending on core infrastructure, which tends to depress 
the economic growth rate (namely, the public investment effect).  Second, tax havens 
provide firms with opportunities for international tax planning, such as interest 
stripping activities.  For example, firms can set up an affiliate in a tax haven, and 
                                                 
2
 Other studies on the positive view of tax havens include Desai et al. (2006b) and Hines (2005, 2006).  
See Dharmapala (2008) for a detailed survey.  
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then finance investment through a loan from that overseas affiliate.  In doing so, the 
interest income is taxed at a lower (zero) rate in the tax haven and the interest 
payment is deducted at a higher rate in the home country.  Hence the firms’ tax 
burden is reduced; in other words, such tax planning lowers the marginal cost of 
capital, and in turn increases the incentives for capital accumulation.  As a result, the 
firms are more willing to invest, thereby stimulating the economic growth rate 
(namely, the tax planning effect).  The overall growth effect therefore crucially 
depends on the two opposing forces.   
 By taking the growth effect into account, we demonstrate that the level of social 
welfare in the second-best equilibrium may be higher or lower in the presence of tax 
havens.  This result could be treated as a vehicle to synthesize the previous mixed 
results (the traditional “negative” view and the new “beneficial” view) of the welfare 
effect of tax havens.  It should be noted that although our conclusion that tax havens 
may increase the welfare in high-tax countries is similar to Hong and Smart (2010), 
the main intuition behind our result and theirs is quite different.  In the present paper, 
the social welfare reflects the representative household’s consumption path.  On the 
one hand, the tax planning effect reduces welfare since it encourages capital 
accumulation and thus reduces consumption.  On the other hand, if tax havens boost 
growth, they can raise the slope of the consumption path and enhance welfare (i.e., the 
growth-stimulating effect).  If the latter effect outweighs the former, tax havens can 
improve the social welfare.  This growth-stimulating effect is not considered in 
previous studies supporting the new beneficial view of tax havens.   
Our simulation results further point out that the welfare effect of tax havens 
crucially depends on two parameters: the initial income tax rate and the government 
expenditure share in production.  The basic idea is that if the economy is initially at 
its efficient state, then introducing tax havens is a distortion and thus depresses social 
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welfare.  However, if the economy is inefficient in the sense that the initial income 
tax rate is too high or the government expenditure share in production is too small, tax 
havens could act as a correcting device to remedy the unjustifiably high tax rates.  
 The structure of this paper is arranged as follows.  In Section 2 we explain the 
motivation of our endogenous growth approach, and discuss what new implications 
we can add to the existing literature.  In Section 3 we establish an endogenous 
growth model that incorporates tax havens.  Within this framework, we examine the 
growth effect of tax havens in Section 4, and study the welfare implications in Section 
5.  The optimal (welfare-maximizing) and growth-maximizing income tax rates are 
investigated in Section 6.  The last section concludes.  
 
2. Motivation: Why the Growth Approach? 
 In order to strengthen the motivation of our approach, in this section we first 
abstract from the context of growth and present a simple tax competition model with 
tax havens.  We use this conventional model to discuss previous results of tax havens, 
and then provide an idea of the possible implications if the context of endogenous 
growth is brought into the picture, both in the literature on tax havens and that on 
endogenous growth.  
2.1. A simple tax competition model with tax havens 
 The model presented in this subsection is generally based on Hong and Smart 
(2010) and Haufler and Runkel (2012).  Let us consider a large number of identical 
(non-haven) countries, each of which contains many competitive and identical firms 
(we normalize the number of firms to unity), ka  capitalists, and la  workers.  Each 
capitalist possesses κ  units of immobile capital nk  and one unit of mobile capital 
mk .  Each worker is immobile between countries and is endowed with one unit of 
labor that is inelastically supplied to firms.  A representative firm hires the immobile 
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capital, mobile capital, and labor to produce a single final good.  The two types of 
capital are perfect substitutes in the production process. 
In addition to the non-haven countries, there also exist some countries levying no 
taxation on capital income, to which we refer as tax havens.  As discussed earlier, 
tax havens enable the firms to engage in international tax planning.  A firm can set 
up a financial subsidiary in a tax haven, which makes an intra-company loan (by 
paperwork) to its parent company.  The home country of the parent company allows 
the deduction of an interest payment for this loan, while the tax haven levies no tax on 
the interest income of the subsidiary.  We follow Hong and Smart (2010) to assume 
that a firm’s internal debt to its subsidiary is bounded by an exogenous proportion, 
denoted by [0,1)φ ∈ , and that this bound is always binding.  Accordingly, the profit 
function of the representative firm is written as: 
  ( ) ( ) [ (1 ) ]n n m m lf k k r t k r t a wφΨ = − + − + − − , 
where n mk k k= +  is the total capital employed, w  denotes the wage rate, and nr  
and mr  are the net returns on immobile capital and mobile capital, respectively.  
The government imposes a source-based tax at the rate t
 
on each unit of capital.  
The production function has the standard properties 0f ′ >  and 0f ′′ < .3 
 Let ku  and lu  denote the utility of a capitalist and a worker, respectively, so 
that we have k n mu r rκ= +  and [ ]( ) ( )l lu w f k k f k a′= = − .4   Thus, the social 
welfare W can be defined as a weighted utilitarian function: 
  (1 )k k l lW a u a u Tε= + + + , 
where T  denotes the total tax revenues.  The parameter 0ε >  represents the 
higher weight that the government attaches to the tax revenues.  The possible 
justification for 0ε >  is that the tax revenues can be used for income redistribution, 
                                                 
3
 The fixed input labor is omitted from the production function to simplify the notation.  
4
 For analytical simplicity, we assume that the individual’s utility is linear in income.  
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or to reduce the excess burden of other more distortionary taxes (see, e.g., Lai, 2009; 
Hong and Smart, 2010; Haufler and Runkel, 2012). 
 To investigate the welfare effect of tax havens, we differentiate W  with respect 
to the parameter that captures the degree of international tax planning, φ , which 
gives:5 
  
2 2
3
(1 ) 0(1 )(1 )
kdW a f
d
κ φ κ ε
φ ε φ
′′− − += >
+ −
. 
 The above equation is parallel to the interesting result in Hong and Smart (2010) 
that tax havens increase the welfare of high-tax countries.  The insight for this result 
is that governments in a small open economy would ideally like to impose a positive 
tax rate on immobile capital and a zero tax rate on perfectly mobile capital 
(multinationals), whereas for some practical reasons the governments are unable to 
discriminate against them.  Therefore, the existence of tax havens potentially 
improves welfare by giving rise to the desirable differential tax treatment of the two 
kinds of capital. 
2.2. What new can be learned from our growth model? 
 In this subsection we discuss which elements may be missing in the conventional 
model mentioned above.  Broadly speaking, our adoption of the endogenous growth 
model proposed by Barro (1990) could generate new implications for conventional 
models at least in the following four significant respects. 
 First, in the tax competition model, a tax haven is beneficial to welfare mainly 
because it attracts capital inflow ( / / 0k t fφ ′′∂ ∂ = − > ).  As discussed in Chu (2012), 
it is relevant to examine the relationship between tax havens and economic growth 
because capital accumulation is one of the main driving forces of growth.  In other 
words, tax havens affect the incentive to invest, and in turn affect growth that is 
                                                 
5
 A detailed derivation of this equation is available from the authors upon request. 
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relevant to welfare.  Therefore, it is fair to say that the welfare analysis of tax havens 
should not lack an appropriate discussion on the linkage between tax havens and 
economic growth.  Although conventional models can provide insightful viewpoints, 
these models are static in nature, and thus are not very suitable for studying the issue 
of economic growth.  For the purpose of examining the relationship between the 
behavior of tax haven activities and long-term growth in high-tax countries, it would 
be better to resort to a (dynamic) growth model.  On these grounds, our approach 
contributes to the existing literature by being capable of studying the growth effect of 
tax havens.6   
 Second, in the tax competition model the tax revenues are often used to provide 
public goods to increase the individual’s utility, to reduce other distortionary tax, or to 
redistribute income (captured by the parameter ε ).  None of these purposes are 
related to the production side.  In the present Barro-type endogenous growth model, 
however, tax revenues are assumed to be used to establish public infrastructure, which 
generates a positive external effect on the private production.  As will be seen later, 
this setup creates an additional public investment effect of tax havens.  In particular, 
we will demonstrate that this effect, which is not considered in conventional models, 
plays an important role in determining the growth and welfare effects of tax havens. 
 Third, conventional models often consider a small open economy (in the sense 
that the return on mobile capital mr  is exogenously given); our analysis instead deals 
with a relatively large economy in which the return on capital can be endogenously 
adjusted.  Furthermore, these tax competition models typically assume that the 
                                                 
6
 Bucovetsky (2011) studies the issue of tax havens in a dynamic partial equilibrium model.  The 
dynamics in his paper is related to the reputation of tax havens when the interactions between firms and 
havens are repeated infinitely, and is not directly related to the present growth model.  
Koethenbuerger and Lockwood (2010) study the effect of tax competition within an endogenous 
growth model but does not deal with the issue of tax havens.  The most related paper is Chu (2012), 
who develops an Ak-type endogenous growth model to study the optimal thin capitalization rules.  
His paper does not, however, consider imperfect competition and public infrastructure. 
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multinational firms are in the competitive price-taking position and earn zero profit.  
By contrast, our analysis introduces imperfect competition so that firms are able to 
earn a positive profit.  Adopting such a framework not only justifies the firms’ active 
choices in international tax planning but also, more importantly, enables us to analyze 
how distinct market structures influence the welfare effect of tax havens. 
 Fourth, as for practicality, in 2013 the G8 Lough Eene Declaration declared that 
countries should change the rules that let companies shift their profits across borders 
to avoid taxes because fair taxes and promoting transparency are critical for growth 
and economic development across the world.  Our results, which explore the 
conditions under which tax havens may harm the economic growth rate, are 
particularly valuable for policy-makers in high-tax developing as well as developed 
countries who are concerned that tax havens may impede their country’s development. 
2.3. The Barro Proposition 
 In addition to the contributions to the literature on tax havens, our results are also 
related to the issue of the optimal income tax rate in the literature on endogenous 
growth.  In his frequently-cited paper, Barro (1990) shows that the optimal income 
tax rate (i.e., the welfare-maximizing tax rate) is equal to the growth-maximizing tax 
rate.  This result is widely discussed in the literature on endogenous growth models 
featuring government expenditure (see, e.g., Futagami et al., 1993; Turnovsky, 2000; 
Ott and Turnovsky, 2006; Agénor, 2008; Fullerton and Kim, 2008; Gong and Zou, 
2011), and is dubbed the Barro proposition by Ott and Turnovsky (2006).  In this 
paper we reexamine the Barro proposition by introducing international tax planning 
resulting from the emergence of tax havens.  We find that tax planning provides a 
new effect for the optimal tax rate.  In the presence of tax havens, the income tax rate 
generates an additional channel that distorts the decision between consumption and 
savings, thereby reducing social welfare.  As a consequence, the optimal income tax 
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rate is lower than the growth-maximizing income tax rate.  
 
3. An Endogenous Growth Model with Tax Havens 
3.1. The model 
 The model we set up incorporates imperfect competition and tax havens into an 
otherwise standard endogenous growth model proposed by Barro (1990), in which the 
tax financed government services have a positive externality on the production sector. 
The economy is comprised of a continuum of identical infinitely-lived households, 
imperfectly competitive multinational firms, and the government.  
For simplicity, population is normalized to unity.  The representative household 
derives utility from a consumption bundle C  and seeks to maximize its lifetime 
utility, which is given by: 
  dteCU tρ
σ
σ
−
∞
−∫
−
−
=
0
1
1
1
,          (1) 
where 0>ρ  is the constant rate of time preference, 0>σ  is the inverse of the 
intertemporal substitution elasticity in consumption, and C  is a CES index 
aggregated across the differentiated varieties of the consumption good.  As in Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977), we specify that the CES form of aggregate consumption is given 
by: 
01;1
1
1
0
1 ≥>

= −−∫ θθθ dicC i ,  (2) 
where ic  is the consumption of the ith good, and the parameter θ  is the reciprocal 
of the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties.  The parameter θ  also 
represents the degree of monopoly of the multinational firms.  The lower that θ  is, 
the better substitutes the varieties are for each other.  In the case where 0θ = , the 
varieties are perfect substitutes, meaning that the goods market is perfectly 
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competitive.7 
The household inelastically supplies one unit of labor to the firms, implying that 
labor supply sN  can be expressed by 1=sN .  As the owner of the firms, the 
representative household receives the profits of the firms in the form of dividends.  
In addition, the household holds physical capital as its asset, and thus receives capital 
income from lending capital to the firms.  To simplify the analysis, the depreciation 
rate is assumed to be zero.  Therefore, the household’s budget constraint is given by: 
  Π++= wrKK
P
dicp ii∫
−
1
0
,         (3) 
where K  is the capital stock, r  is the real rental rate of capital, w  is the real wage 
rate, Π  denotes the real distributed profits from the firms, and all r , w , and Π  
are in terms of the price index of (composite) consumption goods P .  In addition, 
ip  is the nominal price of the ith consumption good.   
The price index of composite consumption P  is postulated to satisfy 
PCdicp ii =∫10 .  It can be shown that the price index of composite consumption P  
is given by: 
 
11
0
1
−
− 

= ∫ θ
θ
θ
θ
dipP i .           (4) 
It should be noted in this paper that the bundle of composite final goods is treated as 
the numeraire, and hence in what follows the price index of composite consumption 
P  is normalized to unity (i.e., 1=P ).  
The household’s optimization problem can be solved by applying a two-stage 
budgeting decision.  In the first stage, the household maximizes the discounted sum 
                                                 
7
 When θ=0, the model is equivalent to a model with only one single good.  However, the present 
model with many goods is essential because we wish to examine the tax haven effects under different 
market structures.  In fact, as will be shown in Section 5, θ is crucial in determining the welfare effect 
of tax havens.   
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of future instantaneous utilities reported in Eq. (1) subject to the budget constraint 
reported in Eq. (3) with PCdicp ii =∫10  and the initial capital stock 0K .  Then, we 
can formulate the current-value Hamiltonian as follows: 
σ
σ
−
−
=
−
1
11CH ][ CwrK −Π+++ λ , (5) 
where λ  is the shadow value of the physical capital stock K . 
By means of some simple manipulations, it is easy to obtain the standard 
Keynes-Ramsey rule: 
  )(1 ρ
σ
−= r
C
C
            (6) 
In the second stage, the solution to the household’s optimization problem yields 
the demand function for each good: 
CpC
P
p
c i
i
i
θ
θ 1
1
)( −
−
=

= .          (7) 
Eq. (7) indicates that (the absolute value of) the price elasticity of demand for the ith 
consumption good is θ/1 . 
Following Heijdra (2009, pp. 362-363), assume that the household’s investment 
and the government’s spending are also composed of differentiated varieties of the 
consumption good.  Let )( KV =  denote the household’s composite investment and 
G  denote the government’s composite spending.  As in the case of the household’s 
consumption, both the household’s composite investment and the government’s 
composite spending can respectively be expressed as: 
01;1
1
1
0
1 ≥>

= −−∫ θθθdivV i ,          (8a) 
01;1
1
1
0
1 ≥>

= −−∫ θθθdigG i ,          (8b) 
where iv  denotes the household’s investment for the ith good and ig  denotes the 
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government’s spending on the ith good.  It should be noted from Eq. (8b) that the 
government purchases a variety of goods ig , ]1,0[∈i , to establish core infrastructure, 
and hence the government’s composite spending G  can also be treated as an index 
to reflect core infrastructure. 
By a similar derivation to that of the household’s consumption of the ith good, 
the household’s investment for the ith good iv  and the government’s spending on the 
ith good ig , ]1,0[∈i , can respectively be expressed as: 
VpV
P
p
v i
i
i
θ
θ 1
1
)( −
−
=

= .          (9a) 
GpG
P
pg iii θ
θ 1
1
)( −
−
=

= .          (9b) 
Based on Eqs. (7), (9a) and (9b) and 1=P , we can define the total demand for 
each good )( iiii gvcy ++=  as follows:8 
)()(
1
GKCpy ii ++=
−
θ
.          (10) 
We then define the aggregate demand for composite goods GKCY d ++=  , and 
hence Eq. (10) can be rewritten as: 
d
ii Ypy θ
1
)( −= .            (11) 
3.2. International tax planning 
 We now turn to formulate how the multinational firms avoid their tax burden via 
the existence of tax havens.  We borrow the theoretical ideas from Slemrod and 
Wilson (2009) and Hong and Smart (2010).  Assume that each multinational firm 
has an affiliate located in a tax haven jurisdiction, and that the firm can finance 
investment through a loan from an overseas affiliate.  The government of the host 
country, as in Barro (1990), levies a flat-rate income tax but allows for the interest 
                                                 
8
 Heijdra (2009, Ch.12) and Coto-Martínez (2006) make a similar assumption and hence derive a 
similar function for the total demand for each good. 
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payments to the haven affiliate to be deductible from host taxable income.  
Accordingly, the multinational firms that maximize profits are capable of choosing the 
proportion of interest payments to the haven affiliate (interest stripping activities).  
The avoidance services provided by the tax havens are not a free lunch and require 
some (operating) costs, which are correlated with the proportion of interest stripping 
(to be discussed later).  
We then deal with the behavior of the monopolistically competitive firms.  In 
line with the viewpoint proposed by Aschauer (1989), Barro (1990), Turnovsky and 
Fisher (1995), the production technology of the ith firm for product iy  is expressed 
as: 
   
αµα GnAky iii
−
=
1
, 10 <≤ α , 10 << µ ,     (12) 
where 0>A  is a productivity parameter, in  is the labor input, and G  is the 
government’s infrastructure expenditure.  In relation to Eq. (12), three points should 
be mentioned here.  First of all, the government’s infrastructure expenditure G  has 
a positive external effect on the private production with the degree of production 
externalities α .  The production function reduces to the typical AK production 
function in the absence of production externalities (i.e., 0=α ).  Second, as in the 
literature, the production function exhibits constant returns to scale in the two 
growing variables, k  and G .9  This setting, that enables the economy to grow 
continuously, is the nature of endogenous growth models.  Third, private capital and 
public expenditure are Edgeworth complements in the production process;10 hence 
we do not consider the crowding out effect of public investment on private 
                                                 
9
 More generally, the production function should read as ηµα GnAky iii
−
=
1
 where η  denotes the 
degree of production externalities.  However, to sustain a continual growth rate, in line with the 
standard literature (e.g., Barro, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Barman and Gupta, 2010) we 
impose the restriction αη = .   
10
 By definition, private capital and public expenditure are Edgeworth complements (substitutes) if 
( / )i iy k
G
∂ ∂ ∂
∂  is positive (negative).  See, for example, Lindbeck and Snower (1994). 
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investment.  
Based on Eqs. (11) and (12), the maximization problem of the ith firm can be 
expressed as follows: 
  
),,()1(
,,
iiiiiiiiii
snk
krshrkswnrkypMax
iii
−+−−−= ττpi ,    (13a) 
  
d
ii Ypyts θ
1
)(.. −= ,,, 1  (99       (13b) 
      
αµα GnAky iii
−
=
1
.          (13c) 
where τ  is the income tax rate, and is  is the proportion of interest stripping, and 
thus the amount of iirks  is deductible from the taxable income.  The term 
),,( iii krsh  represents the total cost required to engage in tax avoidance.  In order to 
obtain tractable results, we assume that ),,( iii krsh  is a linear function of ik .11 
Moreover, according to Stöwhase (2005), Haufler and Runkel (2012), and Johannesen 
(2010), it is reasonable to assume an increasing marginal cost of tax avoidance.  
Therefore, we follow their settings to consider a convex cost function, which is of the 
form: 
  iiiii krskrsh
2
2
),,( β= .          (14) 
The parameter )0(>β  describes the size of the operating cost for engaging in tax 
haven activities.  Conceptually, the parameter β  can be interpreted as the relative 
size of the accounting fees, or the cost needed to search for the available tax havens.  
To be more specific, a higher value of β  reflects a situation in which it is more 
difficult for the multinational firms to engage in tax avoidance via the existence of tax 
havens.  As β  is extremely large ( ∞→β ), the operating cost is too high for the 
firm to locate any affiliate in tax havens (or there are no available tax havens for the 
                                                 
11
 In an endogenous growth model, it is necessary to assume that the cost grows jointly with another 
growing factor, e.g., capital.  This is admittedly a simplified assumption since there is empirical 
evidence in support of scale economies in tax planning involving tax havens. 
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firms in the home countries).  Under such a situation, no tax haven activities will be 
undertaken, and the economy will reduce to Barro’s (1990) model with imperfect 
competition. 
 Thus the first-order conditions for the firm’s problem are: 
  )
2
1()1)(1( 2iidi
i
i ssr
Y
y
k
y βτθτ +−=
∂
∂−− ,       (15a) 
  w
Y
y
n
y
d
i
i
i =
∂
∂−− )1)(1( θτ ,          (15b) 
  β
τ
=is .             (15c) 
Eq. (15a) points out that the marginal revenue product of capital is equal to the 
marginal cost of capital kMFC .  Eq. (15c) indicates that the optimal avoidance is  
is positively related to the income tax rate and negatively related to the parameter that 
reflects the extent of the operating cost.  When ∞→β , the firm’s optimal 
avoidance approaches zero, meaning that tax avoidance activities are unavailable in 
the economy.  In addition, to exclude the possibility that the amount of the firms’ 
deductible interest payments exceeds the actual total interest payments, in what 
follows we impose the restriction τβ ≥  to ensure that is  cannot be greater than 
unity.  
 The government is subject to a balanced-budget requirement, and levies an 
income tax on the firms to finance government expenditure.  Hence, the 
government’s budget constraint is given by: 
  digp ii∫ 10 ( )dikrsyp iiii∫ −= 10 ττ .        (16) 
3.3. Symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium  
 We focus our analysis on a symmetric equilibrium in which all firms make the 
same decisions so that ppi = , yyi = , nni = , kki = , ssi = , hhi = , and pipi =i .  
Since Π  stands for the real distributed profits of the firms, we can define 
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dii∫=Π 10 pi  (= pi ).  Moreover, let N  denote the aggregate labor demand, K  
denote the aggregate capital demand, and Y  denote the aggregate output.  Then, we 
have =N dini∫ 10 , K = diki∫ 10 , and Y diyi∫= 10 .  Given that the symmetric 
conditions require that yyi =  and ppi =  and that the price index of composite 
consumption P  is normalized to unity (i.e., 1=P ), we can further infer from the 
definitions Y diyi∫= 10  and 110 1 −− = ∫
θ
θ
θ
θ
dipP i  that yY =  and 1== pP .  
Accordingly, the government’s budget constraint reported in Eq. (16) can be rewritten 
as )( srKYG −= τ .  Lastly, by inserting Π (= )pi and Eqs. (15a)-(15c) into the 
household’s budget constraint, Eq. (3), and using the above symmetric relationships, 
we can obtain the resource constraint of this economy hGKCY +++=  . 
 Based on the above discussion, the main equations of the symmetric equilibrium 
of the economy can then be described by the following equations: 
  )(1 ρ
σ
−= r
C
C
,           (17a) 
  )
2
1()1)(1)(1( 2ssr
K
Y βταθτ +−=−−− ,      (17b) 
  w
N
Y
=−− µθτ )1)(1( ,          (17c) 
  β
τ
=s ,             (17d) 
  rKsGCYK 2
2
β
−−−= ,         (17e) 
  
ααα GNAKY −= 1 ,           (17f) 
  )( srKYG −= τ ,           (17g) 
  rKssrKwNrKY 2
2
)1( βττ −+−−−=Π ,      (17h) 
  1== sNN .            (17i) 
As mentioned before, the right-hand side of Eq. (17b) is the marginal cost of 
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capital kMFC .  Given βτ /=s  reported in Eq. (17d), the marginal cost of capital 
can be alternatively expressed as kMFC ]2/)2[( 2 βτβ −= r .  To facilitate our 
subsequent discussion, it is convenient to define βτββτ 2/)2(),( 2−=∆ , and hence 
we have the following result:  kMFC ),( βτ∆= r . 
In line with the literature on endogenous growth, we define the balanced-growth 
path as a competitive equilibrium where all growing variables ),,,( GKYC  grow at a 
common endogenous growth rate denoted by γ~ : 
 
G
G
Y
Y
K
K
C
C  ====γ~ .          (18)  
Moreover, for future use we define a transformed variable: KGg /= , which 
represents the ratio of government investment to the capital stock.  
 Let us focus the analysis on the steady-state solution.  By using Eqs. (17a)-(17i), 
(18), and the transformed variable KGg /= , we can obtain the following 
steady-state relationships: 
  )~(1~ ρ
σ
γ −= r ,            (19a) 
  ),(~~)1)(1)(1( βταθτ α ∆=−−− rgA ,       (19b) 
  rgAg ~~~
2
β
ττ α −= ,           (19c) 
where a tilde represents the steady-state values.  It is easy to obtain that the function 
βτββτ 2/)2(),( 2−=∆  has the following properties: ),0(),( βτ ∆=∞∆ 1= , 
0/ >∂∆∂=∆ ββ , and 0/ <∂∆∂=∆ ττ .  Based on Eqs. (19a)-(19c), the closed-form 
solutions of the balanced growth rate and the government investment ratio are 
calculated as: 
  








−

 −−−∆−−−−∆=
− ραθτβ
τταθτσγ
α
α
12
)1)(1)(1()1)(1)(1(1~ AAA , (20) 
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ααθτβ
ττ −

 −−−∆−=
1
1
2
)1)(1)(1(~ AAg .       (21) 
In the next sections, we utilize Eqs. (20) and (21) to analyze how the economic 
growth rate is related to the behavior of tax havens.   
 
4. The Growth Effect of Tax Havens 
 We are now in a position to examine the growth effects in the presence of tax 
havens.  We first infer the relationship between the government investment ratio and 
tax havens.  From Eq. (21) the following result can be derived: 
  0)2(
4)1)(1)(1(~
1
1~
22
2
>


−−−−−= τβ
ταθταβ
α Ag
d
gd
.    (22) 
Note that an increase in β  is associated with less utilization of tax havens.  
Therefore, Eq. (22) indicates that tax havens are harmful to tax revenues so that the 
elimination of tax havens will increase government expenditure.  This finding is 
consistent with the result of Slemrod and Wilson (2009), who claim that the existence 
of tax havens ambiguously erodes tax revenues, and hence reduces the provision of 
public goods.  
 From Eq. (20) we can infer the relationship between the balanced growth rate 
and the utilization of tax havens: 
  
0
~
~~
1)1)(1)(1(
~
effect 
investment Public
1
effect      
planningTax 
<
>
+

∆
∆−∆−−−=
−

βασαθτβ
γ ααβ
d
gdggA
d
d
.   (23) 
Eq. (23) reveals that the growth effect of tax havens is ambiguous.  As emphasized 
in Eq. (23), the existence of tax havens affects economic growth through two channels.  
On the one hand, the services provided by tax havens can offer opportunities for 
international tax planning, which contributes to a lower marginal cost of capital.  As 
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a consequence, growth is boosted as a result of more incentives to accumulate capital.  
We refer to this effect as the tax planning effect, which supports the viewpoint of a 
beneficial tax haven.  On the other hand, tax havens also allow for legal tax 
avoidance that erodes the tax revenues.  Given that the government’s infrastructure 
expenditure is beneficial to private production, the growth rate is depressed following 
a reduction in government infrastructure expenditure.  We refer to this effect as the 
public investment effect.  To sum up, whether the existence of tax havens enhances 
or worsens growth depends mainly on the magnitude of these two opposite forces.  
Obviously, under the situation in association with 0=α , the public investment effect 
is absent since government expenditure does not play any role in private production.  
That is to say, under such a situation only the tax planning effect is present so that the 
elimination of tax havens always causes the balanced growth rate to fall ( 0/~ <βγ dd ). 
 Summing up the above discussion, the following proposition can be established: 
Proposition 1.  When government expenditure exerts a positive externality on the 
private production sector, the elimination of tax havens raises the public investment 
ratio, and has an uncertain effect on the balanced growth rate.  By contrast, if the 
positive externalities of government expenditure are absent, eliminating tax havens 
always reduces economic growth. 
 
5. Welfare Implications  
 This section deals with how the existence of tax havens affects welfare.  We 
present the results via both analytical and numerical analyses.  
5.1. Analytical results 
   Along the balanced growth equilibrium, the time path of private consumption 
is given by tt eCC γ
~
0= , where 0C  is the initial level of consumption.  Substituting 
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t
t eCC
γ~
0=  into Eq. (1), the welfare function (i.e., the indirect life-time utility 
function of the representative household) can be expressed by: 
  

 −−−−=
−
ργσρσ
σ 1
~)1(1
1~ 10CU ,        (24) 
where 20 0[(1 ) / 2 ]C Ag r Kατ τ β γ= − + −   , and 0K  is the given initial level of the 
capital stock.  Next, by substituting 20 0[(1 ) / 2 ]C Ag r Kατ τ β γ= − + −   , Eqs. (19a) 
and (19c) into Eq. (24), we obtain: 
  

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
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−−−
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1
0
12
r
Kr
U .  (25) 
Without loss of generality we assume 10 =K  in the following analysis.  
 To examine the welfare effect of tax havens, one can differentiate U~  with 
respect to β  to obtain the following relationship: 
  
0
Substitution effect
2
0
Income (growth) effect 
1 (1 )(1 )
(1 )(1 )
1
(1 )(1 ) 2
CdU
r
d
C d
d
σ
β
θ α
β θ α
τ γσ θ α β σ σ β
−
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


,     (26) 
where γσρ ~)1( −−≡Ω . In line with Barro (1990), we impose the condition 
γσρ ~)1( −>  to ensure that the welfare level is bounded, thereby enabling us to 
ascertain 0>Ω .   
We can see from Eq. (26) that the sign of βdUd /~  is either positive or negative 
due to the undetermined sign of βγ dd /~ .  That is to say, the welfare effect of tax 
havens is uncertain.  To explain this result more intuitively, we divide the impact of 
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tax havens on welfare into two parts, namely, the substitution effect and the income 
effect (or growth effect).  The first term in the brackets in Eq. (26) is the substitution 
effect, which is positive, indicating that the existence of tax havens is harmful to 
welfare.  The intuition for this effect can be interpreted as follows.  First, since the 
services provided by havens lower the marginal cost of capital, the firms are inclined 
to use more capital.  Second, more use of tax havens results in more resources 
devoted to tax havens that cannot be used for investment or consumption.  In both 
cases, the effect leads to a lower level of consumption, and thereby causes welfare to 
decrease.  On the other side, the second term in the brackets captures the ambiguous 
income effect, which states that the existence of tax havens in Eq. (26) will enhance 
(worsen) welfare by boosting (reducing) the economic growth.12  Specifically, when 
0/~ >βγ dd , both effects are positive, and thus the elimination of tax havens certainly 
improves the welfare level.  However, when 0/~ <βγ dd , two conflicting effects 
work together so that the overall welfare effect is determined by the relative 
magnitude between these two effects. 
The above discussions can be summarized by the following proposition: 
Proposition 2.  A tax haven always reduces welfare if it causes economic growth to 
deteriorate.  However, if a tax haven boosts growth, the welfare effect is ambiguous, 
implying that a tax haven may enhance the welfare of high-tax countries.13 
                                                 
12
 Let Φ  denote the term 1011211 )()2()1()1( −−−−− Ω+−+−−∆ σσβταθ c  in Eq. (26).  Mathematically, if 
σ  is extremely small, Φ  may possibly become negative.  The case of 0Φ <  corresponds to the 
situation in which, other things being equal, the welfare suffers a loss from higher economic growth.  
We do not intend to deal with this unrealistic case and thus simply assume that 0Φ > .  In fact, this 
condition is met under almost all possible parameter values within a reasonable range. 
13
 It should be noted that the utility function does not take into account the endogenous choice of 
leisure in the analysis.  In his growth model with endogenous labor supply, Turnovsky (2000) finds 
that a rise in the capital tax rate decreases the fraction of time devoted to work and thus reduces growth.  
On the other hand, he also finds that a rise in government expenditure reduces leisure.  Based on these 
results, it can be inferred that, if we introduce leisure in our model, tax havens (which reduce the 
effective tax rate as well as the tax revenues) have an additional ambiguous effect on labor time and 
growth.  Both different working time and the growth rate affect the level of welfare.  As a result, the 
welfare effect of tax havens may adjust quantitatively if leisure is introduced into the analysis.  We are 
grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention. 
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 To examine the role of market structure and production externalities in relation to 
the welfare effect of tax havens, we first deal with the situation where production 
externalities are absent ( 0=α ).  By substituting 0=α  into Eq. (26), we can infer 
that the substitution effect is positive ( 0)1/(~ >−∆ θθ βr ) and the growth effect is 
negative (see Proposition 1).  Therefore, unlike the growth effect, the welfare effect 
of tax havens is still uncertain in the absence of production externalities.  However, 
under the situation where production externalities are absent and the product market is 
perfectly competitive 0== θα , the substitution effect is zero and the growth effect 
is negative, implying that 0/~ <βdUd  is true.  This means that, with perfect 
competition in the product market and the absence of production externalities, making 
greater use of tax havens is associated with a higher level of welfare.   
 Thus, the following proposition is obtained: 
Proposition 3.  With perfect competition and the absence of production externalities, 
tax havens certainly improve welfare.  By contrast, in the presence of imperfect 
competition, the welfare effect of tax havens is ambiguous even if the government 
spending has no enhancing effect on private production. 
Proposition 3 sheds light on the role of market structure in determining the 
welfare effect of tax havens.  Intuitively, in the non-distortion case where perfect 
competition is present and the government spending has no production externality to 
private-sector production, tax havens that allow the firms to avoid the tax are always 
welfare-enhancing.  However, if the product market is imperfectly competitive, the 
consumption level will be lower since the firms produce too few goods compared to 
the case of perfect competition.  Introducing tax havens will aggravate this distortion 
by reducing the marginal cost of capital and thus giving the firms more monopoly 
power.  As a consequence, tax havens lead to an additional negative welfare effect if 
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the firms can exert monopoly power.  Therefore, even if the government spending is 
purely wasteful and tax havens certainly boost economic growth, the effect of tax 
havens on the welfare level is determined by the relative strength of the positive 
growth effect and the additional negative effect. 
5.2. Numerical results 
Due to the mathematical complexity in Eq. (26), we then provide some 
numerical examples to illustrate the welfare effect of tax havens, and report our 
numerical results in Table 1.  In order to highlight the role of various structural 
parameters, it is convenient to establish a benchmark scenario.  The benchmark 
scenario involves the following parameter values.  First, as frequently documented in 
the existing literature including Jones et al. (1993) and Zeng and Zhang (2007), the 
inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity in consumption and the time 
preference rate are set as 05.0=ρ  and 5.1=σ , respectively.  Second, in line with 
Barro (1990), the degree of government expenditure externalities in the production 
function is set as =α 0.25, and the income tax rate is set to be equal to the 
government expenditure share 25.0=τ .  This in turn implies that the government’s 
spending as a proportion of GDP is 24.5%, which is close to the ratio in many 
developed countries (see, e.g., Gali, 1994, Table 5).     
Third, the parameter that describes the monopoly power is specified as 
=θ 0.028, such that the resulting profit ratio in our economy is 4%, and nearly tallies 
with the profit ratio of the typical US industry (see, e.g., Basu and Fernald, 1997).14  
Fourth, to test the role regarding the extent to which the tax havens have been utilized, 
the benchmark value of β  is set to 7, indicating that the corresponding tax revenue 
loss to GDP ratio is 0.5%.15   We also assume that the firms face a constant 
                                                 
14
 Basu and Fernald (1997) find that the profit ratio of the typical US industry is about 3%.  The ratio 
is expected to be higher for multinationals since they can engage in international tax planning.  
15
 For example, Clausing (2009) estimates that the tax revenue loss from international tax planning 
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returns-to-scale technology so that 25.0=µ .  Finally, the productivity parameter 
0.383A =  is calibrated such that the balanced growth rate is 3%.  
 
Table 1. Welfare effect of tax havens 
Baseline parameters: 25.0=α , 05.0=ρ , 5.1=σ , 0.028θ = , 25.0=τ , 0.25µ = , 0.383A =   
 
(a) 
Baseline 
(b)
1.0=α  
(c)
4.0=α  
(d)
8.0=σ  
(e)
2.2=σ  
(f)
01.0=θ  
(g)
1.0=θ  
(h)
1.0=τ  
(i)
4.0=τ  
1=β  
-97.1285 -55.8820 -171.663 76.4872 -157.891 -96.8165 -98.3649 -107.842 -98.5244 
4 -96.5947 -57.1992 -168.693 76.9455 -156.358 -96.2621 -97.9090 -106.839 -100.874 
7 -96.5548 -57.4025 -168.321 76.9893 -156.257 -96.2208 -97.8749 -106.702 -101.288 
10 -96.5411 -57.4848 -168.176 77.0055 -156.225 -96.2067 -97.8631 -106.648 -101.458 
13 -96.5343 -57.5294 -168.099 77.0139 -156.209 -96.1996 -97.8573 -106.619 -101.551 
 
Table 1 shows the effect of changing the parameter regarding the use of tax 
havens ( β ).  The numerical results in Table 1 reveal some welfare implications.  
First, the column labeled (a) in Table 1 shows that, under the benchmark scenario, 
greater utilization of tax havens (a smaller value of β ) reduces the level of welfare.  
Second, a change in the degree of monopoly power parameter θ  and the time 
preference rate σ  only affect the results quantitatively.  Third, the benchmark 
result would be qualitatively reversed following a change in the parameter value of 
either the government expenditure share or the initial income tax rate.  To be more 
specific, we can find that greater utilization of the tax havens becomes beneficial to 
welfare in the following two cases: where there is a lower government expenditure 
share ( 1.0=α ) and/or a higher initial income tax ( 4.0=τ ).  To understand the 
economic intuition behind this result, one must realize that in the basic Barro (1990) 
model without any tax havens, the only distortion in the economy consists of the 
production externalities of government expenditure, which is corrected by the income 
                                                                                                                                            
may be as high as US$90 billion in 2008, which is 0.5% of the US GDP for that year.  
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tax.  Once we take the existence of tax havens into consideration, one of the major 
consequences is that it will reduce the “effective” tax rate owing to the participation in 
tax avoidance activities.16  If the economy without tax havens is originally at its 
optimal steady state, then allowing for tax havens constitutes an additional distortion 
and thus will certainly make the economy worse.  On the contrary, if the production 
externality of government expenditure is very small or the initial income tax rate is 
too high, the tax havens can serve as a correcting device to remedy the unjustifiably 
high tax rate.  Under such a situation, tax havens improve social welfare.  This is 
what we see in the columns labeled (b) and (i) in Table 1. 
 
6. Optimal Income Tax 
 In his famous paper, Barro (1990) shows that, in the presence of production 
externalities, the welfare-maximizing income tax rate is exactly equal to the 
growth-maximizing tax rate.  This section makes an effort to reexamine the validity 
of the Barro proposition in the presence of tax havens.  To this end, by differentiating 
Eq. (25) with respect to τ  we have: 
 
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               (27) 
 Let γτ  denote the income tax rate that maximizes the growth rate and Uτ  
denote the income tax that maximizes welfare.  We see from Eq. (27) that, with no 
tax havens ( ∞→β ), 0/ =−=∆ βττ  is true, and hence the first term in the brackets 
on the right-hand side is zero.  Under such a situation, 0/~ =τdUd  if and only if 
                                                 
16
 Let YsrKYG E ),()( βτττ =−= , where ),( βττ E  denotes the effective income tax rate.  We can 
infer that 0/ >∂∂ ττ E  and 0/ >∂∂ βτ E .  The latter indicates that introducing tax havens 
(decreasing β ) reduces the effective income tax rate. 
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0/~ =τγ dd , implying that Uττ βγβ ∞→∞→ = limlim .  This is the well-known Barro’s 
proposition.  However, if tax havens are present (when β  is positive and relatively 
small), we have 0<∆τ , thereby rendering the first term in the brackets in Eq. (27) 
negative.  Then, we can infer from Eq. (27) that τdUd /~  is negative as 
0/~ =τγ dd .  As a consequence, we can conclude that Uττ γ >  in the presence of 
tax havens.  We depict the above discussions in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The optimal income tax rate 
 
The intuition of Figure 1 can be understood as follows.  As mentioned above, it 
is clear from Eq. (27) that the main reason for Uττ γ >  lies in τ∆ , which reflects the 
effect of income tax on the marginal cost of capital.  To be more specific, once the 
tax avoidance services provided by tax havens are available, raising the income tax 
rate has an additional effect of increasing the benefit of tax avoidance behaviors and 
thus further decreases the marginal cost of capital ( 0<∆τ ).  This in turn leads the 
firm to boost investment (use more capital) and crowds out private consumption.  As 
a result, the level of welfare is reduced in association with a lower level of 
consumption.  In other words, the existence of tax havens leads the income tax to 
generate an additional distortionary effect on the allocation of resources between 
Optimal taxes without 
tax havens 
Optimal taxes with tax 
havens 
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saving (investment) and consumption.  This additional effect does not emerge in the 
Barro economy, in which the welfare-maximizing income tax rate is equal to the 
growth-maximizing tax rate.   
Proposition 4. With the existence of tax havens, the welfare-maximizing income tax 
rate is lower than the growth-maximizing income tax rate. 
 
 
Figure 2. The welfare-maximizing and growth-maximizing income tax rates 
 
 A numerical illustration of Proposition 4 is exhibited in Figure 2.  We utilize the 
same parameter values under the benchmark scenario.  Several findings revealed in 
Figure 2 deserve some comments.  First, both γτ  and Uτ  decrease with β , 
meaning that the growth-maximizing tax rate and the welfare-maximizing tax rate 
need to be higher with more tax haven activities.  This is obviously because tax 
havens reduce the effective tax rates in high-tax countries.  Second, given that our 
baseline parameter regarding the government expenditure share is =α 0.25, the Barro 
proposition is valid if Uττ γ = 25.0== α .  As is clearly displayed in Figure 2, 
25.0=>> αττ γ U  is true.  This result indicates that the growth-maximizing income 
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tax rate is greater than the welfare-maximizing income tax rate, and hence the Barro 
proposition becomes invalid by introducing tax havens.  Third, in association with a 
lower extent of tax haven activities (a higher β ), the gaps between tax rates ( γτ  and 
Uτ ) and α  decline.  Not surprisingly, when we increase β  to approach infinity, 
both γτ  and Uτ  coincide with the 0.25α =  in the simulation model, indicating 
that the Barro proposition holds in the absence of tax havens.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 This paper makes an attempt to study the consequences of the recent rise of tax 
havens on economic growth and social welfare in high-tax countries.  Our analysis 
shows that the growth rate of high-tax countries may either increase or decrease with 
the presence of tax havens.  To be specific, the rise of tax havens affects economic 
growth through two conflicting channels, namely, the positive tax planning effect and 
the negative public investment effect.  The overall growth effect is determined by the 
relative strength between these two forces.  As for welfare analysis, we show that tax 
havens could improve the social welfare in high-tax countries due to the possible 
growth-stimulating effect.  A beneficial tax haven is more likely to be the case if the 
government expenditure share in production is low; or the initial income tax rate is 
high.  Moreover, we show that the welfare-maximizing income tax rate should be 
lower than the growth-maximizing income tax rate.  Therefore, the Barro proposition 
is not valid in the presence of tax havens. 
 Two extensions can be considered in future research.  First, this paper focuses 
on the effects in high-tax host countries.  However, since the empirical studies find 
that tax haven countries often experience a higher rate of economic growth (see, e.g., 
Hines, 2006; Butkiewicz and Gordon, 2013) it would also be interesting to study the 
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growth performance in tax haven jurisdictions.  For this purpose, a two-country 
growth model may be a plausible framework.  Second, Desai et al. (2006a) find that 
the firms using tax havens often have high R&D intensities.  Based on this finding, 
an interesting extension would be to study the relationships among innovation, growth, 
and tax havens using an R&D-based endogenous growth model proposed by Romer 
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).  These issues, 
we believe, merit further research on tax havens and economic growth. 
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